In addition, given my time as Director of the FTC's Office of Policy Planning, I have been a strong voice in support of competition advocacy. Such advocacy is necessary in many instances to combat proposed regulatory barriers to entry supported by incumbent interests.
Thus, my long history with competition advocacy also shapes my views on these issues. 
II.

North Carolina Dental and State Licensing Boards
One of the clearest examples of the "Brother, May I?" challenge arises in the state licensing of professionals. Here, my-and the Commission's-concern has been the artificial and unjustified barriers to entry erected by some state licensing boards, including, in particular, those composed of active participants in the very markets they regulate. This issue came to a head in the Commission's successful Sherman Act Section 1 case against the North Carolina
Board of Dental Examiners (the Board). 4 See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) .
the States accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and control." 10 Third, in addressing the states' concern about their licensing boards incurring antitrust liability and damages, the Court observed that states can ensure Parker immunity is available to agencies by adopting clear policies to displace competition, and, if those agencies are controlled by market participants, by providing active supervision. 11 Finally, the Court made clear that the critical inquiry is "whether the State's review mechanisms provide 'realistic assurance' that a nonsovereign actor's anticompetitive conduct 'promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests. '" 12 The North Carolina Dental decision was a crucial victory for competition and consumers. Under our federal system, individual states can do a lot to meddle with the free market; that is their choice to make. However, states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers. 13 Of course, with a nod to George
Stigler's insights from the 1970s, the North Carolina Dental Board's conduct can be easily explained as rent-seeking behavior by incumbents to fend off a new source of competition.
14 Where there is a benefit concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of incumbent providers, in this case dentists, and the competitive harm is dispersed across all consumers of health care services, public choice theory predicts such incumbent exploitation of state licensing laws and regulations. 15 The adverse competitive results of such behavior are manifest. 16 Now, some have described this type of situation as an example of regulatory capture. 17 But, it is more than regulatory capture; it is the regulated replacing and acting as the regulators.
Looking at North Carolina Dental and our other recent Supreme Court win in Phoebe Putney, which I will discuss shortly, the state action area is one of the best examples of the Commission using its unique institutional features to guide the courts and others in the development of competition law toward better outcomes for competition and consumers.
Looking ahead, the Commission should continue to focus both its enforcement and competition advocacy efforts on anticompetitive licensing activities within the states.
Nonetheless, I believe we ought to give the states some breathing room to respond to the changed legal landscape that they now face. 
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A particular concern I have is that the "Brother, May I?" aspect of occupational licensing can create unnecessary barriers to entry for entrepreneurs seeking to take their first step on the economic ladder. This is particularly true for occupations that draw individuals who are just beginning a professional career. Licensing requirements, which often include educational components, can prevent lower-income workers, who may not be able to pay for additional education, from entering certain fields-even at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder.
Competition and competitive markets, supplemented by sound antitrust enforcement, where necessary-not excessive licensing-will promote entrepreneurship in this country and provide the best platform for the least advantaged in our economy to prosper.
III.
Phoebe Putney and Certificate-of-Need Laws
Another example of needing to obtain permission from one's competitors to enter the market is found in certificate-of-need, or CON, laws that remain on the books in over two-thirds 22 Id. at 6; see also id. at 12-13 (collecting studies); Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1111-12 (2014) ("The work of Kleiner and his contemporaries reveals a consensus in the academy: a licensing restriction can only be justified where it leads to better quality professional services-and for many restrictions, proof of that enhanced quality is lacking."). 23 See Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing, supra note 21, at 6. 24 See, e.g., id. at 16 ("The net effects [of licensing] can be regressive, as lower-income consumers-who now have to pay higher prices and may have less access to services ranging from haircuts to dental exams-pay more to the regulated practitioners, some of whom are well compensated.").
of the states. 25 Under these laws, would-be suppliers of a host of health care services, from acute care hospitals to nursing homes to rehabilitation centers, must seek approval from a state entity to enter the market. The real issue in a typical certificate-of-need determination is not, however, one of ensuring patient safety or the proper qualifications of the applicant-there are other laws and regulations that typically address those issues more directly-but rather the "need" for a new entrant into the market at issue, as determined by the state entity. 26 As I will discuss, CON laws have outlived their intended use and now effectively serve primarily, if not solely, to assist incumbents in fending off competition from new entrants. The Commission and the public were reminded of the anticompetitive effects of those laws most recently in the Phoebe Putney matter.
There, the FTC challenged a merger involving a local hospital authority in Albany, Georgia. The transaction was viewed by nearly everyone, including the Eleventh Circuit, 27 as a virtual merger to monopoly. As is well known at this point, the Commission litigated this case all the way to the Supreme Court, which ultimately sided with the agency in its unanimous 2013 decision. 28 To be immune from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine, private and other non-sovereign entities must demonstrate that the state "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" a policy displacing competition and thus allowing the otherwise anticompetitive conduct at issue. 29 The Court held that a general grant of corporate powers to a sub-state entity, such as a hospital authority, is insufficient by itself to satisfy the clear articulation prong of
Midcal. 30 The challenged transaction, thus, was not immune from antitrust scrutiny, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
So far, so good for patients in Albany. The FTC complaint counsel resumed the administrative litigation that had been stayed pending the federal court proceedings. It did not take very long, however, before the agency recognized a potentially insurmountable hurdle to a successful resolution of this case: the Georgia certificate-of-need laws. That is, even if the Commission could have established liability-and that seemed fairly likely, given the facts-the state CON laws would have prevented a divestiture of any hospital assets. Now, the case took an admittedly circuitous route during its final eighteen months.
Unfortunately for consumers of hospital services in the Albany area, a state hearing officer ruled that the CON laws would apply to any divestiture that might take place in this matter. The fact that the Albany region is deemed "over-bedded" made it unlikely that any divestiture buyer could obtain the necessary CON approval to operate an independent hospital. Thus, last March, Like any barrier to entry, CON laws prevent or limit the entry of firms that could otherwise provide higher-quality or lower-priced services than those offered by incumbents. In other words, output restrictions lead to higher, not lower, costs; they also result in higher profits for incumbent firms.
34 DOJ-FTC Illinois Testimony, supra note 33, at 1-2. 35 See id. at 2; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION ch. 8, at 6 (July 2004), available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/improving-health-care-dosecompetition-report-federal-trade-commission-department-justice (" [T] he Agencies urge states with CON programs to reconsider whether they are best serving their citizens' health care needs by allowing these programs to continue."). 36 The CON area is just one example of empirical work conducted by FTC economists lending support to, and thus increasing the effectiveness of, the Commission's competition advocacy efforts. 37 See, e.g., DOJ-FTC Illinois Testimony, supra note 33, at 5 n.16 (collecting studies). 38 
See DANIEL SHERMAN, BUR. OF ECONOMICS, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EFFECT OF STATE CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED LAWS ON HOSPITAL COSTS: AN ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS vi (Jan. 1988), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/effect-state-certificate-need-laws-hospital-costs-economic-policy-analysis; see also id. at iv ("The study thus finds no evidence that CON programs have led to the resource savings they were designed to promote, but rather indicates that reliance on CON review may raise hospital costs."). Let me also address what appears to be the primary argument that states make in support of retaining CON laws: the ability to cross-subsidize care provided to uninsured or underinsured patients. 43 The argument is that, without CON laws, new entrants will engage in creamskimming by taking the most profitable patients, thus depriving incumbent providers of revenue that is used to provide care to otherwise under-served or unserved patients-particularly at community or safety-net hospitals. Now, the public-policy goal of ensuring access to adequate health care services for patients who cannot afford them is certainly a laudable one. Using the 40 See, e.g., DOJ-FTC Illinois Testimony, supra note 33, at 7; A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 35, at Exec. Summ. at 22 ("Market participants can too easily use CON procedures to forestall competitors from entering an incumbent's market."). Incumbent providers have also entered into anticompetitive agreements that were outside of, but nonetheless facilitated by, the CON laws. See, e.g., DOJ-FTC Illinois Testimony, supra note 33, at 7-8. 41 See e.g., Sandefur, supra note 15, at 176 ("Public choice theory predicts that where the government can redistribute wealth or opportunities between private groups, those groups will invest their resources in obtaining favorable legislation that will benefit them or handicap their rivals. Entry restrictions like occupational licenses or CON laws are made-to-order examples."). 42 See e.g., id. at 173 ("Public choice theory would also predict that as economic and technological circumstances change, CON laws would nevertheless remain on the books-vigorously defended by incumbent firms-long after the economic rationales on which they were based were rendered obsolete, even on their own terms."). blunt and anticompetitive tool of CON laws, however, is not the answer. Such a use of CON laws flies in the face of any notion of free-market competition. 44 Clearly, there are a host of difficult issues relating to the payment and provision of health care in this country that go far beyond CON laws and that may not have easy answers. The commission established to study the efficacy of the Georgia CON program in the mid-2000s, for example, was unable to reach consensus with regard to the best policy to address the difficult issue of cross-subsidization of indigent care. 45 As the commission recognized, "When viewed in a vacuum, analysis has shown a relatively weak effect of CON, but the CON program is being used as a regulatory device in an environment involving much stronger forces." 46 Nonetheless, using CON laws as an indirect tax for funding indigent care imposes costs-in terms of price, quality, and innovation-across all consumers of health care services. 47 There are less competitively-restrictive and more politically-transparent means for pursuing the goal of indigent care. In fact, there is some evidence that CON laws do not actually advance the goal of indigent care at general community hospitals. 48 Finally, as the antitrust agencies have noted in their advocacies in this area, CON laws were not adopted as a means of cross-subsidizing health 44 See e.g., Sandefur, supra note 15, at 170 ("Whatever the merits of the 'cream-skimming' and incentives rationales, they apply only to public utilities, or perhaps to markets that feature some kind of monopoly characteristics. They do not apply to private markets with healthy competition. In these markets, 'cream-skimming' is simply the ordinary competitive process on which the economy depends for innovation and growth, and encouraging investment where market demand is lacking is rightly seen as foolhardy."). 45 See GEORGIA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 43, at xiii. 46 Id. 47 See, e.g., Cordato, supra note 26, at 18 ("If CON laws are being used to hide this tax from the electorate, then not only are they inconsistent with sound economics, they are also inconsistent with an open and democratic political process."). 48 See, e.g., DOJ-FTC Illinois Testimony, supra note 33, at 9-10; THE LEWIN GROUP, supra note 39, at ii, 26-28 ("Through our research and analysis we could find no evidence that safety-net hospitals are financially stronger in CON states than other states.") (finding margins for safety-net hospitals in CON states "considerably lower" than margins for safety-net hospitals in non-CON states).
care. 49 That is an ex post rationale identified by CON proponents that is simply inconsistent with free-market principles. More, not less, competition is needed in the health care space.
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My recommendation, then, is for the Commission to re-engage with state legislatures on the issue of CON laws. With the Noerr-Pennington 51 doctrine rightly protecting incumbents'
petitioning activity related to CON applications, there is little, if any, room for law enforcement action in this area. We have not, however, addressed this issue in our competition advocacy since 2008. Of course, the Commission typically issues advocacy comments only in response to invitations from policy makers or requests for public comments. I would urge the agency to continue that practice. Still, we ought to seek out opportunities to weigh in on the adverse impact of CON laws on consumer welfare. The Commission has been on a bit of a winning streak in challenging anticompetitive hospital mergers. 52 It would be unfortunate if any more of those victories for health care consumers were jeopardized by CON laws that preclude any meaningful remedy in those cases.
IV.
McWane and Exclusionary Conduct by Monopolists
During the remainder of my remarks, I will address a third "Brother, May I?" situation in which a would-be entrant must effectively rely on its competitor's permission before entering or expanding its business. This one involves not state regulation but private conduct by a monopolist that is exclusionary and thus maintains its monopoly and is not justified by a 49 See DOJ-FTC Illinois Testimony, supra note 33, at 4. 50 See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 35, at Exec. Summ. at 4 ("Vigorous competition, both price and nonprice, can have important benefits in health care as well. Price competition generally results in lower prices and, thus, broader access to health care products and services. Non-price competition can promote higher quality and encourage innovation."). 73 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws-or that might even be viewed as procompetitive-can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist."). 74 See, e.g., supra note 44.
V. Conclusion
Thank you for your attention this morning. I hope my remarks have shed some light on the problems that these "Brother, May I?" approaches create for free-market competition and how targeted antitrust enforcement and advocacy, supported by sound economic analysis, can help limit the damage. I also hope that my call to reduce these barriers, which particularly harm those on the bottom rung of the economic ladder, will encourage others to take up the challenge.
I would be happy to entertain any questions you may have.
